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I. INTRODUCTION
On 11 October 2011, the European Commission published
the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law. This
Common European Sales Law1—CESL—is based on the
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR),2 which in turn
drew heavily on the Principles of European Contract Law
(PECL).3 CESL contains provisions on contract formation,
contract interpretation including unfair contract terms
and—as its core part—obligations and remedies of the par-
ties to a sales contract.4 Furthermore, provisions on damages
and interest, restitution as well as prescription can be found.
Thus, the sphere of application of the CESL is more or less
identical with the UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) with the exception of
unfair contract terms. The CISG now has 78 member states
and is by far the most successful5 international private law
convention worldwide along with its sister UN Convention
on Limitation.6
This paper will rst compare the approach and main solu-
tions of the two instruments. It will discuss whether the
CESL has improved the solutions already found in the CISG
1
The CESL forms Annex I of the Regulation. After the publication of
the Proposal, the European authorities received reasoned opinions from
the Austrian Federal Council, the Belgian Senate, the German Bundestag
and the United Kingdom House of Commons, respectively, objecting to
CESL on the grounds that it infringed the subsidiarity principle. The
threshold for an automatic review of the draft was, however, not met (see
http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/dossier.do?code=COD&year=
2011&number=0284&appLng=EN).
2
C. von Bar et al. (Eds.), Principles, Denitions and Model Rules of
European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Sellier
European Law Publishers, Munich, 2009.
3
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) (1999), available at ht
tp://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commissiononeuropeancontractlaw/PEC
L%20engelsk/engelskpartIogII.htm.
4
For a general overview of CESL see Staudenmayer, Der Kommis-
sionsvorschlag für eine Verordnung zum Gemeinsamen Europäischen
Kaufrecht, NJW, Vol. 64, 2011, pp. 3491 et seq.
5
See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, ‘The CISG — A Story of Worldwide
Success,’ in J. Kleinemann (Ed.), CISG Part II Conference, Iustus, Up-
psala, 2009, p. 140.
6
UN Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale
of Goods of 14 June 1974.
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and whether the gaps that still exist in the CISG have been
lled in an acceptable way. It will then discuss whether such
regional unication alongside the global unication of sales
law seems at all desirable and what the prospects of such an
optional instrument on the European level might be in
practice.
II. SCOPE OF APPLICATION
Let me rst address the scope of application of the two
instruments.
1. Opt in v. opt out
The rst dierence between the CESL and the CISG
pertains to the mechanism of how and when the respective
instruments apply.
Whereas the CISG automatically applies if the prerequi-
sites of its Art. 1 CISG—both parties having their places of
business in Contracting States, or the rules of private
international law leading to the application of the law of a
Contracting State—are met, the CESL is optional, i.e. the
choice of the CESL requires an agreement of the parties to
that eect. If the parties choose the CESL, the choice covers
the CESL as a whole, and not only parts of it.7 At the same
time, the drafters of the CESL consider the choice of CESL
as implying an agreement of the contractual parties to
exclude the CISG should it otherwise apply.8 Whether such a
disposition can be ordered by the European authorities
seems at least very doubtful, as the question whether the
parties validly opted out from the CISG is entirely to be
decided autonomously under the CISG itself.9
2. Sales of Goods Contracts Dened
Both instruments govern sales of goods contracts. How-
ever, their respective scopes dier substantially.
The CISG does not dene the term “goods” itself. Thus,
the scope of this notion must be interpreted autonomously.
7
See Proposal, Para. 24.
8
See Proposal, Para. 25.
9
See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in I. Schwenzer (Ed.), Schlechtriem
& Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, Art.
6, Para. 4; see also Hesselink, How to Opt into the Common European
Sales Law? Brief Comments on the Commission's Proposal for a Regula-
tion, 20 European Review of Private Law 201 (2012).
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From the very beginning, it has been highly debated whether
the sale of software is governed by the CISG or not.10 The
now prevailing view holds that the CISG applies if software
is permanently transferred to the buyer, irrespective of the
mode in which the software is delivered, e.g. via disc or, as
usually today, via the internet.11 Thus, the CISG has been
able to easily adjust to ever-changing modern electronic
developments.
The CESL, in contrast, still denes goods as “any tangible
movable items,”12 thus explicitly excluding software. This
narrow and rather outdated denition of goods requires that,
in addition to “sale of goods,” the “supply of digital content”
has to be mentioned separately in all relevant provisions.13
Another dierence relates to so-called mixed contracts. In
this respect, the CISG follows a rather pragmatic approach.
According to Art. 3(2) CISG, the CISG applies to a mixed
contract if the supply of labour or other services does not
form the preponderant part of the obligations. If the whole
contract is governed by the CISG, its provisions also apply to
the service part. Thus, a judge or arbitrator does not have to
decide whether the fact that the goods do not live up to the
contractual requirements results from their own features or
from a possible breach of a service obligation.
Again, the approach taken by the CESL is dierent.14 It
only applies to so-called related services, i.e. any service re-
10
I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art.
1, Para. 18.
11
See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9),
Art. 1, Para. 18; see also C. Kee, ‘Rethinking the Common Law Denition
of Goods,’ in A. Büchler & M. Müller-Chen (Eds.), Private Law, national—
global—comparative, Festschrift für Ingeborg Schwenzer zum 60. Geburt-
stag, Stämpi, Bern, 2011, pp. 930 et seq.
12
See Art. 2(h) Regulation.
13
For the denition of digital content see Art. 2(j) Regulation; see fur-
ther Feltkamp and Vanbossele, ‘The Optional Common European Sales
Law: Better Buyer's Remedies for Seller's Non-performance in Sales of
Goods?,’ 19 European Review of Private Law 879 et seq (2011).
14
See also H.-W. Micklitz & N. Reich, ‘The Commission Proposal for a
“Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL)”—Too Broad or
Not Broad Enough?,’ in H.-W. Micklitz & N. Reich (Eds.), The Commission
Proposal for a “Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL)”—
Too Broad or Not Broad Enough?, EUI Working Paper LAW 2012/04,
European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, 2012, pp. 12 et
seq.
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lated to the goods or digital content such as installation,
maintenance, repair or processing, but explicitly excludes
training services15 that ordinarily play an important role in
more complex sales contracts on the international level.16
Furthermore, even if the mixed contract is covered by the
CESL, there is a distinct liability scheme for the breach of a
service obligation. Whereas liability for breach of the delivery
obligation under the CESL is strict, liability for breach of a
service obligation depends on fault.17 This means that the
adjudicator faces the often unresolvable task of exactly at-
tributing the consequences of non-conformity to the goods
themselves or the services part of the contract.
3. B2B and B2C Contracts
In regard to the personal scope, the CISG is pretty
straightforward: it is concerned with international B2B sales
contracts, B2C transactions are practically excluded.18
Again, the approach taken by the CESL is dierent. The
starting point is the cross-border European B2C sales
contract, and indeed the whole instrument exudes the
underlying policy of consumer protection, which is one of the
main goals of unication of private law at the European
level. The Explanatory Memorandum explicitly states that
the Proposal “is consistent with the objective of attaining a
high level of consumer protection.”19 The second aim is to
help small or medium-sized enterprises (SME) to benet
more from opportunities oered by the internal market.20 Ac-
cording to Art. 7 Regulation, the CESL may be used in B2B
15
See Art. 2(m) Regulation; see also Art. 6 Regulation: exclusion of
mixed-purpose contracts.
16
See further N. Reich, ‘An Optional Sales Law Instrument for
European Business and Consumers?,’ in Micklitz & Reich 2012 (supra
note 14), pp. 85 et seq., p. 89: “The scope and content of part V on “Ser-
vices related to a sales contract” seem to be incomplete, contradictory and
will not provide legal certainty of cross-border B2C transactions (. . .).”
17
Art. 148(2) CESL.
18
Art. 2(a) CISG; see I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in Schwenzer 2010
(supra note 9), Art. 2, Paras. 4 et seq.
19
P. 6.
20
See Explanatory Memorandum, p. 7.
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contracts only if at least one of the parties is a SME.21 It
remains an open question why the CESL, as an opting-in
instrument, cannot be chosen by two commercial entities if
neither qualies as a SME.22 Furthermore, the CESL seems
to assume that, in B2B sales contracts, the SME—like the
consumer—is always on the side of the buyer, which
certainly is not the case in reality.
4. Subjects Covered
As we all know, the CISG is only concerned with the
formation of the contract, the rights and duties of the parties
and the remedies in case of breach of contract. Issues of
limitation of actions are covered by the CISG's sister UN
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International
Sale of Goods, which, however, has not gained wide approval.
There are signicant areas not covered by the CISG, espe-
cially validity issues.23
The CESL, in addition to the areas covered by the CISG
and the Limitation Convention, lls some of the open or at
least perceived gaps left by the CISG. Apart from the right
to withdraw in B2C contracts,24 it deals with mistake, fraud,
threat and exploitation,25 addresses unfair contract terms,26
and prolically regulates pre-contractual information
21
According to Art. 7(2) Regulation, a SME is a trader with less than
250 employees and an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million Euros.
22
However, the Member States may open the CESL for other parties
than SME; see also P. Mankowski, ‘Der Vorschlag für ein Gemeinsames
Europäisches Kaufrecht (CESL),’ Internationales Handelsrecht, Vol. 12,
2012, p. 3; H. Eidenmüller et al., ‘Der Vorschlag für eine Verordnung über
ein Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht,’ Juristen Zeitung, Vol. 67,
2012, pp. 273 et seq.; Scottish Law Commission, ‘An Optional Common
European Sales Law: Advantages and Problems,’ November 2011, avail-
able at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/CommonEuropeanSal
esLawAdvice.pdf, p. 88.
23
Art. 4 sentence 2(a) CISG; see in detail I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem,
in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 4, Paras. 29 et seq.
24
Arts. 40–47 CESL.
25
Arts. 48–57 CESL; see on these issues A.E. Martens, ‘Die Regelung
der Willensmängel im Vorschlag für eine Verordnung über ein Gemein-
sames Europäisches Kaufrecht,’ Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, Vol.
211, 2011, pp. 845 et seq.
26
Arts. 82–86 CESL.
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duties.27 Still, signicant areas of general contract law are
not covered by the CESL and thus are left to the otherwise
applicable domestic law.28
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND
FAIRNESS
One of the major problems each commercial contract law
system has to face is the tension between certainty and
predictability on the one side and fairness on the other side.
Shall the parties be bound to what they agreed or shall the
adjudicator be granted the power to interfere with their
agreement on grounds of fairness and conscionability? Al-
ready in 1598, Shakespeare put this question in the centre
of his play “The merchant of Venice.” Is Antonio bound to his
promise of “a pound of esh” in case of not being able to
repay the loan or is this an unfair contract term to be
disregarded under the circumstances?29
It is one of the most salient features of English commercial
law that it strongly favours certainty over fairness whereas
many civil law legal systems tend to rely on notions of good
faith and fair dealing. It was against this background that
in the CISG “the observance of good faith in international
trade” was only inserted in Art. 7(1) CISG as one criterion
among others to be taken into consideration in interpreting
the Convention. However, the drafters of the CISG explicitly
decided against any provision imposing a duty of good faith
on the parties themselves. Thus, in particular, the German
notion of Treu und Glauben cannot be applied under the
CISG although German courts and authors seem to some-
times disregard this fact.30 By contrast, the CESL explicitly
states that each party has a duty to act in accordance with
good faith and fair dealing.31 Any breach of this duty may
not only preclude the breaching party from exercising or
relying on a right, remedy or defence which it would
27
Arts. 13–22 CESL; see A. De Boeck, ‘B2B Information Duties in the
Feasibility Study: Analysis of Article 23,’ European Review of Private
Law, Vol. 19, 2011, pp. 790 et seq.
28
For further criticism see Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22),
pp. 271 et seq.
29
See Scottish Law Commission 2011 (supra note 22), p. 106.
30
See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9),
Art. 7, Para. 17.
31
Art. 2(1) CESL.
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otherwise have but may in and of itself give rise to liability
for any loss thereby caused to the other party.32 This far
reaching principle is hardly reconcilable with the necessity
of certainty and predictability in commercial transactions
and thus will certainly not be acceptable at least to most
Common Law lawyers.33
IV. AMENDED RULES
Let us now turn to some core areas of any sales legislation
where the CESL chose to deviate from the CISG.
1. Non-conformity of the Goods
The litmus test for any sales law are the rules on non-
conformity of the goods.34
The CISG oers clear and convincing solutions in this
regard which have in many instances proven to yield satis-
factory results. Consequently, these provisions have served
as a role model for domestic35 as well as the European
legislator.36 The CISG rules emphasise the importance of the
contract being the rst and foremost reference point for the
conformity of the goods.37 Only if the parties have not made
contractual provisions for any specic features of the goods
does the CISG establish subsidiary presumptions to decide
whether the goods conform to the contract.38
Without any obvious necessity, the CESL has deviated
32
Art. 2(2) CESL.
33
See Scottish Law Commission 2011 (supra note 22), pp. 106 et seq.,
p. 113; see further Hofmann, Interpretation Rules and Good Faith as
Obstacles to the UK's Ratication of the CISG and to the Harmonization
of Contract Law in Europe, 22 Pace Int'l L. Rev., 159 et seq. (2010).
34
For a comparative overview of the dierent approaches to non-
conformity see I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem & C. Kee, Global Sales and
Contract Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, Paras. 31.26 et seq.
35
The approach taken by the CISG has been followed by modern and
recently modernized legal systems in Central Europe, the Nordic systems
as well as Eastern Europe and Central Asia; see Schwenzer & Hachem &
Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Para. 31. 45, with further references.
36
In particular, Art. 2 of the Directive 99/44/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on Certain Aspects of the Sale
of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees was based on Art. 35
CISG, which has thus found its way into all domestic legal systems which
have implemented the Directive.
37
See Art. 35(1) CISG.
38
See Art. 35(2) CISG.
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from the convincing concept of the CISG.39 In particular, it
should be noted that deviations were not dictated by
consumer protection. Firstly, the CESL does not recognise
the important distinction between contractual designation of
conformity and the statutory default rule.40 Instead, it
requires the goods to comply with contractual requirements
as well as the default criteria for non-conformity,41 thus rely-
ing on a mixed subjective/objective approach.42 This may well
lead to absurd results as goods may be perfectly conforming
to contractual requirements but not pass the objective test.
Foodstu that is no longer t for human consumption may
well be sold as animal food. Goods without a CE label that
may not be sold in the EU may perfectly be t for export to
other regions in the world.43 Furthermore, in addition to the
long list of subjective and objective criteria, Art. 100(g) CESL
contains a catch-all provision requiring the goods to “possess
such qualities and performance capabilities as the buyer
may expect.” How these expectations are to be assessed
remains largely obscure.44
Both the CISG and the CESL require the goods to be free
from any right or claim of a third party including those that
are based on industrial or other intellectual property.45
However, whereas under the CISG it is nowadays unani-
mously held46 that any claim by a third party triggers the
39
See also Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), p. 280, according
to whom the drafters of CESL should have adopted the provisions of Art.
35 CISG rather than experimenting with the notion of conformity.
40
This is also evidenced by the very order in Art. 66 CESL that sug-
gests that the non-mandatory rules of CESL prevail over implied terms of
the contract.
41
See Arts. 99, 100 CESL; see also Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011
(supra note 13), pp. 886 et seq.
42
See also Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), pp. 886 et
seq.
43
See for the interplay of the CE mark and conformity of the goods I.
Schwenzer, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 35, Para. 14.
44
For similar criticism see Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra note
13), p. 887.
45
See Art. 42 CISG; Art. 102 CESL.
46
See I. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 41, Para.
10, Art. 42, Para. 6.
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seller's liability, the CESL limits the seller's liability to cases
where the claims are not obviously unfounded.47
In a B2B contract both under the CISG and under the
CESL, the buyer can only rely on any lack of conformity if it
gave notice to the seller after a proper examination of the
goods.48 At the Vienna Conference these provisions were
highly debated leading to the well-known compromise that if
the buyer has an excuse for not having examined the goods
or giving proper notice it may still reduce the price or claim
damages except for loss of prot.49 Under the CESL, instead
of oering a better protection to SME buyers—as envis-
aged—the prerequisites for examination and notice are even
higher.50 Examination must be undertaken within a rigid 14
days from the date of delivery of the goods51 and there is no
exception in case of reasonable excuse. A further change for
the worse as regards the position of the buyer is the fact
that the notice in any case must reach the seller to become
eective52 whereas under the CISG53 the seller bears the risk
that the notice is lost or delayed in transit.
2. Remedies
The second core area of any sales law codication is the is-
sue of remedies in case of breach of contract.54 The CISG and
CESL agree on the basic structure of remedies, as they ap-
ply the remedy-oriented approach rather than the old Ro-
47
Art. 102(1) CESL; see also Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra
note 13), p. 888.
48
Arts. 38, 39, 43 CISG; Arts. 121, 122 CESL.
49
Art. 44 CISG.
50
Arts. 121, 122 CESL; see also Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra
note 13), pp. 895 et seq.
51
Art. 121(1) CESL.
52
Art. 10(3) CESL.
53
Art. 27 CISG.
54
See C. Wilhelm, ‘Die Rechtsbehelfe des Käufers bei Nichterfüllung
nach dem Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission für eine Verordnung
über ein Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht (KOM [2011] 635 endg.),’
Internationales Handelsrecht, Vol. 11, 2011, p. 226; Eidenmüller et al.
2012 (supra note 22), pp. 280 et seq.; Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra
note 13), pp. 897 et seq.; Scottish Law Commission 2011 (supra note 22),
pp. 59 et seq.; see further, for a comparative overview, Schwenzer &
Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Paras. 41.01 et seq.
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man cause-oriented approach.55 Upon closer analysis of the
remedies, however, remarkable dierences appear.
a. Specic Performance
The rst remedy to discuss is specic performance.56 It is
well known that the CISG has not bridged the gap between
Common Law57 and Civil Law58 legal systems concerning the
general remedy of specic performance. Instead, it leaves it
to the court or arbitral tribunal to decide whether it enters a
judgment for specic performance.59 It has to be emphasised
that this compromise has not given rise to diculties in
practice.60 In accord with continental legal thinking, the
CESL, from a systematic perspective, instead seems to envis-
age specic performance as the primary remedy.61 Thus, the
principal provision for the buyer's right to specic perfor-
55
See I. Samoy & T. Dang Vu & S. Jansen, Don't Find Fault, Find a
Remedy, European Review of Private Law, Vol. 19, 2011, pp. 862 et seq.;
Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Paras. 41.45 et seq.;
for a comparison of CISG and CESL regarding the seller's right to cure
see S. Kruisinga, The Seller's Right to Cure in the CISG and the Common
European Sales Law, European Review of Private Law, Vol. 19, 2011, pp.
911 et seq.
56
See generally Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34),
Paras. 43.01 et seq.
57
See Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Paras. 43.24
et seq.
58
See Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Paras. 43.11
et seq.
59
See Art. 28 CISG: “If, in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention, one party is entitled to require performance of any obligation
by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgement for specic
performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of
similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention.”
60
M. Müller-Chen, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 10), Art. 28, Para.
4.
61
Wilhelm 2011 (supra note 54), p. 226; see also Scottish Law
Commission 2011 (supra note 22), pp. 65 et seq.; Samoy & Dang Vu &
Jansen 2011 (supra note 55), p. 869; see further, on the DCFR, G. De
Vries, ‘Right to Specic Performance: Is There a Divergence between
Civil- and Common-Law Systems and, If So, How Has It Been Bridged in
the DCFR?,’ European Review of Private Law, Vol. 17, 2009, pp. 596 et
seq.; M. Stürner, ‘Die Grenzen der Primärleistungspicht im Europäis-
chen Vertragsrecht,’ European Review of Private Law, Vol. 19, 2011, pp.
180 et seq.
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mance does not contain any truly relevant restrictions.62 A
reasonable restriction of the remedy of specic performance
in cases where the creditor should resort to a substitute
transaction is not provided in the context of the buyer's right
to specic performance, but only for the respective right of
the seller in case of breach of contract by the buyer.63 It ap-
pears doubtful whether such an approach is acceptable to
any Common Law lawyer.
A special form of specic performance in case of non-
conformity of the goods is repair and replacement.64 The
CISG restricts the seller's obligation to replace non-
conforming goods to cases where non-conformity amounts to
a fundamental breach of contract in order to avoid costly
and unreasonable transportation of the goods.65 This restric-
tion is not found in the CESL, not even for a B2B contract.
It may be questionable whether this makes commercial sense
between a Lithuanian seller and a Portuguese buyer. It
certainly cannot serve as a model on the global scale.
b) Avoidance of Contract
In B2B contracts, both the CISG as well as the CESL in
principle allow avoidance of contract in case of a fundamental
breach of contract supplemented by the so-called Nachfrist-
principle.66 In B2C contracts, however, under the CESL the
consumer may avoid the contract for any non-conformity un-
less the lack of conformity is insignicant.67
Both sets of rules use an essentially identical denition for
62
See Art. 110(3) CESL: exclusion of specic performance only where
it is impossible or unlawful or where the burden to the seller is
disproportionate to the benet for the buyer; see further Feltkamp &
Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), p. 897. For the general exceptions from
specic performance in Civil Law legal systems see Schwenzer & Hachem
& Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Paras. 43.20 et seq.
63
Art. 132(2) CESL.
64
See Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), p. 898; Samoy &
Dang Vu & Jansen 2011 (supra note 55), p. 869.
65
See Art. 46(2) CISG; see further Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012
(supra note 34), Paras. 49.15 et seq.
66
Buyer: Art. 49 CISG, Arts. 114(1), 115 CESL; seller: Art. 64 CISG,
Arts. 134, 135 CESL; see further Wilhelm 2011 (supra note 54), p. 230;
Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), pp. 899 et seq.; Schwenzer
& Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Paras. 47.112 et seq.
67
Art. 114(2) CESL; see Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), p.
282; Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), p. 901; Wilhelm 2011
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the fundamentality of the breach.68 However, the CESL goes
one step further by holding that fundamentality is also given
where the breach of contract is of such a nature as to make
it clear that the non-performing party's future performance
cannot be relied on.69 Whether such a future breach itself
amounts to a fundamental one is immaterial.
c) Damages
The rules on damages in the CESL70 by and large follow
those of the CISG.71 However, the CESL now contains an ex-
plicit provision that non-economic loss may only be compen-
sated for as far as it results from pain and suering. Other
non-economic losses are excluded.72 The CISG, in contrast,
does not contain a similar restriction, leaving it to further
legal development whether and which non-economic loss
may be compensated.73
3. Force Majeure and Hardship
Both the CISG as well as the CESL provide that the debtor
is exempted from liability for damages in case of an impedi-
ment beyond its control.74 The CESL force majeure provision
can be regarded as being more or less equivalent to that of
the CISG. However, the CESL does not discuss force ma-
(supra note 54), p. 231; see further Scottish Law Commission 2011 (supra
note 22), pp. 60 et seq., criticizing that the consumer's right to avoid the
contract is too long and too uncertain.
68
See Art. 25 CISG; Art. 87(2)(a) CESL.
69
Art. 87(2)(b) CESL.
70
Arts. 159–165 CESL, supplemented by Art. 2(c) Regulation; see fur-
ther Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 282 et seq.; Feltkamp &
Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), p. 903; Wilhelm 2011 (supra note 54),
pp. 232 et seq.
71
Arts. 74–77 CISG; see generally Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012
(supra note 34), Paras. 44.01 et seq.
72
Art. 2(c) Regulation; see further Scottish Law Commission 2011
(supra note 22), pp. 64 et seq., criticizing the restriction as a reduction in
consumer protection.
73
See I. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 74, Paras.
18 et seq., Para. 39; I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, ‘The Scope of the CISG
Provisions on Damages,’ in R. Cunnington & D. Saidow (Eds.), Contract
Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives, Hart Publishing,
Oxford, 2008, p. 100.
74
Art. 79 CISG; Art. 88(1) CESL; see Wilhelm 2011 (supra note 54),
pp. 232 et seq.; see further Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note
34), Paras. 45.01 et seq.
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jeure in the chapter on damages but rather in a Chapter
dealing with “General provisions.”75
Furthermore, it has to be emphasised here once more that,
as regards service obligations, the CESL follows the fault-
based approach of Roman Law descent. Thus, in these cases,
the seller is exempted from liability if there was no fault on
its part.
Unlike the CISG, the CESL contains a specic provision
on variation or termination by court in case of a change of
circumstances commonly referred to as hardship.76 For vari-
ous reasons, this provision is not convincing. First, it seems
preferable to deal with both force majeure and hardship
under the same provision as it is done under the CISG.77 All
too often, drawing the line between force majeure and hard-
ship is not possible. Most subsequent events do not render
performance impossible and thus do not constitute a
veritable impediment; they just render performance more
onerous for the debtor. The prerequisites as well as the con-
sequences for both cases should be the same. Especially, con-
trary to what the CESL suggests,78 there should be no dier-
ence between an initial hardship and hardship caused by a
change of circumstances subsequent to the conclusion of the
contract. Under the CESL, in case of initial hardship, the
debtor would have to rescind the contract for mistake.
Finally, the consequences of hardship laid down in the CESL
are unsatisfactory—at least with regard to sales contracts.
75
Chapter 9, Arts. 87–90 CESL.
76
Art. 89 CESL; see further Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra
note 34), Paras. 45.10 et seq., 45.76 et seq.
77
The modernised German law of obligations also contains indepen-
dent rules on impossibility (§ 275 CC) and hardship (§ 313 CC). In partic-
ular, the relationship between the provision on impossibility due to perfor-
mance having become overly onerous for the debtor (§ 275(2) CC) and the
provision on adaptation of the contract to changed circumstances render-
ing performance overly onerous for the debtor (§ 313(1) CC) has now
caused considerable debate as regards their delimitation, see P. Schlech-
triem & M. Schmidt-Kessel, Schuldrecht—Allgemeiner Teil, 6th edn, Mohr
Siebeck, Tübingen, 2005, Para. 485.
78
See Art. 89(3)(a) CESL: ‘apply only if: (a) the change of circum-
stances occurred after the time when the contract was concluded.’
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The parties' duty to renegotiate79 as well as a possible adjust-
ment of the contract80 to the changed circumstances by a
court or arbitral tribunal is of practical use only in long-term
relationships but usually not in sales contracts. All in all,
here again, the results achievable under the CISG are more
satisfactory than those under the CESL.81
4. Interplay of Dierent Remedies
The relationship between dierent remedies is of great
importance.82 As has been pointed out, remedies laid down
under the CESL just as under the CISG in the special part
relating to seller's and buyer's obligations are subject to
certain restrictions, such as the examination and notice
requirement,83 the fundamentality of the breach in case of
avoidance84 or the foreseeability test in case of damages.85
Under the CESL, however, other remedies exist that may
conict with these remedies and their underlying concepts.86
Most notably, non-conformity of the goods may give rise to
other remedies. Certainly, any buyer of non-conforming
goods is mistaken as to the goods conforming to the
79
Art. 89(1) CESL; see further Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012
(supra note 34), Paras. 45.111 et seq.
80
Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Paras. 45.113 et
seq.
81
See for the solution oered under the CISG I. Schwenzer, in
Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 79, Para. 54; I. Schwenzer, ‘Force
Majeure and Hardship in International Sales Contracts,’ Victoria
University of Wellington Law Review, Vol. 39, 2009, pp. 721 et seq., p.
724; I. Schwenzer, ‘Die clausula und das CISG,’ in W. Wiegand et al.
(Eds.), Tradition mit Weitsicht — Festschrift für Eugen Bucher zum 80.
Geburtstag, pp. 736 et seq.; I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, ‘The CISG —
Successes and Pitfalls,’ American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 57,
2009, pp. 474, 475.
82
See on the lacking hierarchy of remedies under CESL Samoy &
Dang Vu & Jansen 2011 (supra note 55), pp. 869 et seq.; Feltkamp &
Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), pp. 891 et seq.; see generally Schwenzer
& Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Paras. 49.01 et seq.
83
Arts. 38, 39 CISG; Arts. 121 et seq. CESL.
84
Arts. 25, 49(1)(a) CISG; Arts. 87(2), 114(1) CESL.
85
Art. 74 CISG; Art. 161 CESL.
86
For general criticism on the lack of structure and coherence in the
CESL's system of remedies see Samoy & Dang Vu & Jansen 2011 (supra
note 55), pp. 861 et seq.
Proposed Common European Sales Law; International Sale
471© 2012 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 44November 2012
contract.87 Thus, if the prerequisites of Art. 48 CESL are
met, the buyer may avoid the contract notwithstanding
whether for example it gave timely notice of the non-
conformity or whether the breach amounted to a fundamen-
tal one.88 Art. 57 CESL explicitly provides that a party may
pursue either one of the possible remedies.89 Further
problems arise if the seller has failed to comply with any of
its pre-contractual information duties which presumably
usually will be alleged by buyers in case of non-conformity of
the goods. This not only triggers the remedy of avoidance
due to mistake90 but furthermore entails liability for any loss
caused to the other party by such failure which again may
be claimed independently from and additionally to any other
remedies for breach of contract.91 Again, this stands in sharp
contrast to the solution found under the CISG. As the CISG
itself governs neither mistake nor pre-contractual duties, it
is a question of the possible relationship between CISG rem-
edies and concurrent domestic remedies. In case law,92 and
doctrine93 it is now unanimously held that the CISG pre-
empts all concurrent domestic remedies in this eld.
V. FILLING THE GAPS
In order to evaluate the appropriateness of the CESL, it is
useful to also have a look at those areas of sales law that do
not have a counterpart in the CISG. We shall now discuss
87
See for a comparative overview Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012
(supra note 34), Paras. 49.15 et seq.
88
The CESL thus follows the position found in the PECL and the
DCFR; see Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Para. 49.
24.
89
For an overview of the dierent approaches that can be taken in
this respect see Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Paras.
49.11 et seq.
90
Art. 48(1)(b)(ii) CESL.
91
Art. 29(1), (3) CESL.
92
Cf. for France: Cass. civ. 1re, 14 May 1996, Jurisclasseur Périodique,
E´dition Générale, Vol. 71, 1997, No. I-4009; for Austria: OGH, 13 April
2000, CISG-online 576, with a note by P. Schlechtriem, IPRax, Vol. 21,
2001, pp. 161 et seq.; see further the more recent US case Electrocraft
Arkansas, Inc. v. Super Electric Motors, Ltd., US Dist. Ct. E.D. Ark., 23
December 2009, CISG-online 2045.
93
I. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 35, Paras. 46
et seq., Para. 48 with references.
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how the CESL has lled these gaps. Naturally, only a few
select subjects can be discussed here.
1. Pre-contractual Duties and Liability
The CISG, in principle, does not contain any rules on pre-
contractual duties; a proposition to insert a provision on
culpa in contrahendo was even rejected at the Vienna
Conference.94
In contrast, the CESL has devoted a whole chapter to pre-
contractual information duties.95 First of all, a variety of in-
formation duties are established which apply to B2C transac-
tions only.96 But also in a B2B contract, the seller has to give
any information concerning the main characteristics of the
goods which it has or can be expected to have and which
would be contrary to good faith and fair dealing not to dis-
close to the other party.97 In B2B contracts, such vague and
extensive information duties seem to be inappropriate and
must necessarily lead to legal uncertainty that cannot be
tolerated in international trade.98 Further pre-contractual
information duties are established for contracts concluded by
electronic means, especially via websites.99
It has already been pointed out that the possibility to
concurrently rely on remedies for breach of pre-contractual
information duties is particularly problematic.
94
See U.G. Schroeter, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Intro to Arts.
14–24, Paras. 54 et seq.
95
Chapter 2, Arts. 13–29 CESL; see further C. Cravetto & B. Pasa,
‘The ‘Non-sense’ of Pre-contractual Information Duties in Case of
Non-concluded Contracts,’ European Review of Private Law, Vol. 19, 2011,
pp. 761 et seq.; Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 276 et seq.; in
regard to the Feasibility Study see H. Beale & G. Howells, ‘Pre-contractual
Information Duties in the Optional Instrument,’ in R. Schulze & J. Stuyck,
Towards a European Contract Law, Sellier European Law Publishers,
Munich, 2011, pp. 51 et seq.
96
Arts. 13–22 CESL.
97
Art. 23(1) CESL.
98
See S. Whittaker, ‘The ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference’ — An
Assessment,’ Report commissioned by the Ministry of Justice, United
Kingdom, Oxford, 2008, pp. 100 et seq.
99
Art. 24 CESL, applying to B2C and B2B contracts; Art. 25 CESL,
unclear whether (3) may also be applied in B2B transactions.
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2. Non-negotiated Terms
The use of non-negotiated terms is, especially in interna-
tional sales contracts, of great practical importance.
The CISG does not even mention this notion. Now,
however, due to more than 20 years of practical experience,
it has been possible to carve out the essential solutions
pertaining to non-negotiated terms.100
By contrast, the CESL even distinguishes between non-
negotiated terms and standard contract terms.101 For the lat-
ter it practically copies the German Civil Code102 and denes
standard terms as non-negotiated terms which have been
formulated in advance for several transactions involving dif-
ferent parties.103 The necessity for such a subtle distinction
at best remains obscure.104 The dualism of two distinct
concepts in this regard is unknown to any legal system, be it
on a domestic or on the European level.105
The CESL contains a specic regime for non-negotiated
terms and standard terms as regards the incorporation of
such terms into the contract as well as the judicial control of
unfair terms.
a) Incorporation
On the level of incorporation, problems arise where non-
negotiated terms are to be incorporated by reference. The
CESL contents itself with the vague formula that the party
supplying the terms must take reasonable steps to draw the
100
See U.G. Schroeter, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Intro to Arts.
14–24, Paras. 5 et seq., Art. 14, Paras. 32 et seq.
101
Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 278 et seq.; H.-W.
Micklitz, ‘An Optional Law on O-premises, Distance Sales and Unfair
Terms for European Business and Consumers?,’ in Micklitz & Reich 2012
(supra note 14), pp. 58 et seq.; in regard to the Feasibility Study's provi-
sions on unfairness and non-negotiated terms see D. Mazeaud, ‘Unfair-
ness and Non-Negotiated Terms,’ in Schulze & Stuyck 2011 (supra note
95), pp. 123 et seq.; M.W. Hesselink, ‘Unfair Terms in Contracts Between
Businesses,’ in Schulze & Stuyck 2011 (supra note 95), pp. 131 et seq.
102
§ 305(1) sentences 1, 3 CC.
103
Art. 2(d) Regulation.
104
Art. 7(3) CESL seems to imply the presumption that terms in stan-
dard contract terms are non-negotiated terms.
105
See Art. 3 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts, which dispenses with the requirement that
the terms have been drafted for use in more than one transaction.
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other party's attention to them.106 It remains an open ques-
tion whether, especially in B2B contracts, a mere reference
to standard terms is enough. Furthermore, as the require-
ment of transparency does not apply in the B2B context,107 it
is unclear what requirements as to language etc. exist.
Further diculties arise with regard to the battle of forms.
The provision dealing with this issue only applies to stan-
dard terms but not to mere non-negotiated terms.108 It is
hard to see the underlying ratio of this approach. Regardless
of this fact, this provision in essence does not add much to
what is the prevailing opinion under the CISG.109
b) Substantive Control
Whereas under the CISG the substantive control of (all)
contract terms in principle is a question of validity and thus
left to the applicable domestic law,110 the CESL contains
specic provisions for this matter.111 As regards B2C
contracts, in addition to a general clause112 circumscribing
unfairness, the CESL establishes a so-called black list of
contract terms which are always unfair with 11 items113 and
a so-called grey list of terms which are presumed to be unfair
106
Art. 70(1) CESL.
107
Art. 82 CESL only refers to B2C contracts.
108
See the heading and wording of Art. 39 CESL.
109
Under the Convention, the dispute has narrowed down to two
approaches: the so-called last-shot-doctrine and the so-called knock-out-
doctrine. Under the rst doctrine, the non-negotiated terms which have
been sent last become part of the contract. Under the second doctrine,
conicting terms are stricken out and replaced by the default rule. This
second view has come to be the prevailing view under the CISG, see Cass.
civ. 1re, 16 July 1998, CISG-online 344; BGH, 9 January 2002, CISG-
online 651; U.G. Schroeter, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 19,
Para. 36 with numerous references also for domestic laws and uniform
projects.
110
See Art. 4 sentence 2(a) CISG; I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in
Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 4, Para. 30.
111
For criticism see Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 278 et
seq.
112
Art. 83 CESL.
113
Art. 84 CESL.
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with 23 items.114 As regards B2B contracts, the CESL
contains a general clause only.115 This provision slightly devi-
ates from the concept of unfairness in B2C contracts and
only applies to non-negotiated terms.116 According to this def-
inition, a non-negotiated term is unfair if it grossly deviates
from good commercial practice contrary to good faith and
fair dealing. This gives rise to scepticism from two
perspectives: rst, this concept is extremely vague and does
not give any orientation on how to draft fair contract terms.
Second, this provision insinuates that, in a B2B transaction,
an individually negotiated term may never be regarded as
being unfair; a solution that would signicantly lag behind
any domestic and international standard for a control of
unfair terms even in B2B contracts.117
3. Interest
A last lacuna under the CISG which is of great practical
importance must be addressed here. Although the CISG
provides that interest is due on any sum in arrears,118 it does
not state the applicable interest rate.119 This has proven to
be a real obstacle to achieving uniformity. The CESL
contains six provisions on interest on late payments.120 In es-
sence, it links the interest rate to the one applied by the
European Central Bank which is adjusted every six months,
or an equivalent rate set by a national central bank.121 Two
percentage points are added to this rate for any delayed pay-
114
Art. 85 CESL; see further Micklitz 2012 (supra note 101), pp. 62 et
seq.
115
Art. 86 CESL; see Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 278
et seq.
116
Art. 86 CESL.
117
See Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 278 et seq., also
voicing criticism.
118
Art. 78 CISG.
119
See K. Bacher, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 78, Para. 2
with references.
120
Arts. 166–171 CESL. See on the provisions of the DCFR A. Fötschl,
‘Zinsen auf ausservertragliche Geldforderungen im Rechtsvergleich und
eine Analyse der Zinsnormen des Draft Common Frame of Reference
(DCFR),’ European Review of Private Law, Vol. 17, 2009, pp. 106 et seq.;
see further Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 283 et seq.
121
Art. 166(2) CESL.
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ment;122 8% points are added where a trader delays the pay-
ment of the purchase price.123 All in all, this solution may
meet with approval. Still, two points deserve mentioning.
First, there is an explicit provision allowing for compensa-
tion for recovery costs, be it in the form of a lump sum of 40
Euros or as damages if the recovery costs exceed this sum.124
Having special regard to the international discussion
whether pre-trial attorney's fees should be compensated
for,125 this provision seems highly problematic. Furthermore,
all rules on interest are mandatory126 which heavily impairs
freedom of contract in this area.127
VI. CODIFYING STYLE AND TECHNIQUES
As concerns the dierent codifying style and techniques of
the CISG and the CESL, one is rst struck by the sheer
length of the CESL compared to the relatively short CISG.128
This is partly due to the approach taken towards denitions.
Under the CISG, denitions are a rare exception. Their
absence has not led to any problems. Contrary to the CISG,
122
Art. 166(2) CESL.
123
Art. 168(1)(5) CESL.
124
Art. 169 CESL.
125
Zapata Hermanons Sucessores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Company,
Inc., US Ct. App. (7th Cir.), 19 November 2002, CISG-online 684; see fur-
ther Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra note 34), Paras. 44.166 et
seq.; I. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 74, Paras. 28 et
seq.; CISG AC Opinion No. 6, ‘Calculation of Damages under CISG Article
74,’ Rapporteur J. Gotanda, 2006, available at <http://www.cisgac.com/def
ault.php?ipkCat=128&ifkCat=148&sid=148>, Comments 5.1 et seq.
126
Art. 171 CESL. There seems to be a contradiction between Art. 170
CESL that deals with unfair terms relating to interest and Art. 171 CESL
that prohibits any deviation from the statutory scheme.
127
See also Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 283 et seq.
128
Harsh criticism from U. Huber, ‘Modellregeln für ein Europäisches
Kaufrecht,’ ZEuP, Vol. 16, 2008, p. 742: “The provisions on sales law have
to be completely reformulated. [. . .] The reader should not be given the
impression that the drafters think it to be slow-witted.” See also Eiden-
müller et al., ‘Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen für das Europäische
Privatrecht — Wertungsfragen und Kodikationsprobleme,’ Juristen
Zeitung, Vol. 63, 2008, p. 549: “Reading the DCFR is tiring, because so
much of its content is superuous and because it contains numerous
repetitions.”
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the Regulation itself contains a long list of denitions.129
While it is laudable that the drafters have attempted to
achieve a common understanding of legal terms, it is hardly
understandable why the text of the CESL again is packed
with sometimes repetitive and sometimes further
denitions.130
The sheer length of the CESL does not, however, contrib-
ute to clarity.131 Although, in comparison to the DCFR, the
CESL has been shortened considerably, the attempt to
include as many scenarios as possible into the wording of
the CESL has considerably inated the text. This prolixity,
however, has not prevented the drafters from an exorbitant132
use of general clauses. The CISG, although using much less
general clauses, already has been criticized for its
vagueness.133 The CESL, from this viewpoint, will hardly be
acceptable,134 especially to Common Law lawyers.135
Finally, it is regrettable that the CESL does not use the
same terminology as the CISG.136 The drafters of the CISG
endeavoured to depart from domestic legal concepts, instead
seeking an independent legal language. Indeed, to a large
129
Art. 2 Regulation.
130
See for example Art. 7(1) CESL in addition to Art. 2(d) Regulation.
See also Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), p. 272, with further
examples of repetitive clauses.
131
See Eidenmüller et al. 2008 (supra note 128), p. 549; Feltkamp &
Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), p. 905; Huber 2008 (supra note 128), p.
742.
132
See, in regard to the DCFR, Eidenmüller et al. 2008 (supra note
128), p. 536, who provide an impressive account of the excessive use of
general clauses in the DCFR; see further Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011
(supra note 13), p. 905, voicing concern that the use of open-end clauses in
CESL will not lead to a sucient level of legal certainty.
133
Against this criticism Schwenzer & Hachem 2009 (supra note 81),
p. 467.
134
See Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), p. 905, according
to whom the CESL is “not ripe for implementation.”
135
See for the concerns raised in the United Kingdom the Report issued
by the European Union Committee of the House of Lords, European
Contract Law: The Draft Common Frame of Reference—Report with
Evidence, London, House of Lords, Stationary Oce, 2009, Paras. 31 et
seq.
136
For criticism regarding the wording of the German version of CESL
see Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), p. 272.
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extent, they succeeded. The CESL tries to reinvent the wheel
by changing terminology that for almost 30 years now has
become the lingua franca of international sales law. A
prominent example, which is also crucial for trade practice,
is the replacement of the term ‘avoidance for breach of
contract’ used by the CISG with the term ‘termination’ in
the CESL. The fact that the very term avoidance is used by
the CESL in the context of mistake is hardly helpful to ease
communication.137
VII. CONCLUSION
The CESL, as it has been published recently, is hardly an
improvement to the CISG that is now in force in 23 states
out of the 27 European Union member states.138 It has been
shown that in many areas the dierences cannot satisfy the
needs of international trade.139 Many of these changes were
highly inspired by the German Civil Code and its underlying
19th century principles as well as a strong desire for
consumer protection, both of which do not provide an ade-
quate framework for B2B transactions.140 This is especially
true for the abundant number of general clauses and vague
terms.141 The recurrently emphasized principle of good faith
certainly will not be regarded with favour by anyone coming
from a Common Law country and does not add much to clar-
137
We are aware that PICC and PECL follow the same terminology as
the DCFR. However, both sets of rules do not contain specic provisions
on sales law and already their departure from the language of the CISG is
most unfortunate.
138
Ireland, Malta, Portugal and the United Kingdom have not ratied
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For similar criticism already on the DCFR see J. Basedow,
‘Kodikationsrausch und kollidierende Konzepte — Notizen zu Marktb-
ezug, Freiheit und System im Draft Common Frame of Reference,’ ZEuP,
Vol. 16, 2008, pp. 673 et seq.; see further K. Riesenhuber, ‘Information
über die Verwendung des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Kaufrechts,’
Zeitschrift für Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht, Vol. 9, 2012, p. 5, raising the
question whether CESL can achieve its goal of harmonization.
140
For similar criticism see also Micklitz & Reich 2012 (supra note 14),
p. 31, who conclude that the CESL should be limited to B2C transactions,
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ity and predictability—one of the principal necessities in
international trade. But this is not at all due to a stronger
protection of commercial buyers under the CESL as alleged
by the aim of the Regulation. Instead, as has been shown,
there are several instances where —with more clarity—the
CISG oers buyers better protection than the CESL.142
All in all, the CESL does not provide a viable alternative
to the CISG.143 Practice needs a simple uniform law for all
international and domestic sales contracts. This is why many
modern legislators, especially in Eastern Europe, modelled
their domestic sales law according to the CISG.144 The CESL
being only an optional instrument on the European level, it
is—at the very least—doubtful whether any sensible trader
will opt for it.145 In essence, this would mean that sellers and
buyers would need to adapt their contracts to three dierent
situations: domestic, European and global. Furthermore, the
experiences made with the PICC146 clearly show that parties
do not make use of optional instruments in their choice of
law clauses.147 Whereas about 80% of disputes resolved under
the auspices of the ICC contain a choice of law clause,
142
See the references to questions of notice, obviously unfounded
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143
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and Transnational Contracts,’ in H. Flechtner et al. (Eds.), Drafting
Contracts Under the CISG, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp.
167, 174, 177; F. Zoll, ‘The Impact of CISG on Polish Law,’ Rabels
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Vol. 71,
2007, pp. 81 et seq.
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Law,’ European Review of Private Law, Vol. 19, 2011, p. 720; see further
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ment,’ EuZW, Vol. 22, 2011, p. 8.
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Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich, 2009, p. 401; Lando 2011 (supra
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opting-in instruments such as the PICC are chosen in only
0.8% of these contracts, although they may be well appropri-
ate to supplement the CISG.148 It seems all the more improb-
able that parties would opt out of the CISG and into the
CESL which in itself would have to be supplemented by do-
mestic law.
It is regrettable that the European Union chose such a
Sonderweg instead of maintaining its leading position in the
development of the CISG and raising its voice in the global
concert. With the CISG becoming more and more important
on the global scale, it is important that any harmonisation
or unication of laws in Europe ensures that the CISG
remains untouched. Hopefully, however, UNCITRAL will
take the lead and develop a set of rules of general contract
law supplementing the CISG and thus lling the still exist-
ing gaps. Such a global contract law should be modelled on
the PICC and the PECL, but certainly not on the CESL.
148
Mankowski 2009 (supra note 147), p. 401.
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